HE last two years have been any-thing bunt tranqsnil for tine U.S. econonnsy, Insterest rates, for exansiple, has-c be-ems hsigls assel yolatile-. Twice dumrinsg tisis period tisey rose td) record levels-. thsec prissse rate hsit 2 O percemst in April 1980, tile-n rose to 21.5 percent ins Jantnary 1981. Two reeessiomss have oc'ctnrrecei during thsis brief period, one ofwhich apparently still hinsgers. Signsificcant finanscial chansges hayec takecns place withs ams insflunx of deposits imito usonsey nssarket nsscntunal funds ansci ans ountflosy fronn small tinsse mine 1 sax'ings clecpns its -Tise nsaticinswicle legalizatiens of NOV 7 accotensts ins early 1981 also re-semIte-cl inn mc sizable realieseatiots cnf funnels -Amssid all of' these cieye-lopnse ists, money growth also has be-eu epnite yolatile.
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Should thse s~enlatiI itv ofshort-run usiomsey groxs'tls lie a nssatter of eonseerms? Tlsere appear to lie two ehistinsct schools of tlsocnght with regard to tls is qunestion -One selsool argcnecs that snnch volatility is nscit re-ally a prnble-mns. It holds thsmet ''tlsec mmccci for 1 sreeisec shsort-runns nssone-y sunpplv control is tee-lsnicah ly questiossable.''l Tue othecr selsool argsnecs that such yolatility elannage-s tisec eccinsonniv. lor exansple, M iltoms Frieelnsams, ins evalu natins g mnonsetarv p0 hey ox-er tise last eounple of ecars hsas written that ''the yo-y-o swimsgs ins nnomietarv growth alfe-ctecd tbse e-cnnsonuy-chirectls-, as well as th rough mite-re st rates -E mccii sunrgec ins nsieisse-tary' growth 55-mIs feslloxs'eel after sounse-nnnonsths h~ass mteceleration ins spendable incomn e, enutput amsel ecnsiploymecnt; anwi each dcccl imse ins momietary growth, by a re tarciatiou -'2 Sonnsexx'hsmtt surprisingly', thsec two schools des midst ehsagree about theoretical issunes. Bciths selsools -agree that, ins theory, tise-decsirahihity of stabihizinsg shortrunns rnousecv grosvtls clepensds ons the stability-of the puhhic's densuansd for mssonev. Aehsievinsg stable nssonse growths hemseflts tbsc eceononsy onsly if tise pumhhic's elennsmtnsel for nnnomsecy dines nsot ehansge unnnecxpe-cteccllv.
The issue that separates tlsec two schoois oftlsoughst is ehsiecfhy ans e-nspirical onse hsmus nuonsey clennanncl lice-ni re-asonmnlsb y s tmchile P Tisose who argune that the 'olmitilift of slsort-rcnns monecy greiwtls ins thsec past has nsot bee-n mu prohslenss hoTel tlsmtt usouev demansci has lie-ens snbjeete-d to mc series of tnmspreelictable shifts. Ac--con-dinsg to this n'easomsinsg, hscs Idinsg tlsec rate of nsseinsev growths ins mc tigist hmusd would have inssposecel sig-,siflemcnst e-essts ccii tise ecconsnnsy. Suppose. for examssple, the public wants to hcdid lmuge-r mnmc~nseybalmcmnces -If' sneechs a precferecnsce is thwarted by an mcelherenicec ted pre-estabh ishse-d msscnmsetary tmcrgets, the econseimsi y xvcnunld he sunidjectecel tes unmseccessary recstrainst. Imnehiyiehuuals sececkiusg ten hinnild thsecir nnsonney halms.nsces xxii I recelcnce-thsecir clennsauei for gcsoeis -and se-ryiees'amsei finanscial assets, resenltinng ins mcmi ecddnsonsic slowdown -'l'he otlner se-hsool mergunes that nssonnev eheussmnnseh has hceccns hsasic'mcily stmcisle. Ins this yiew, mns Frieclmann eomstenscls, rapid nssomse-e groxvtls cdyen'stinssunlates theccc'esnscdnssy, unitimsuate-ly e'auesins g insflatiecns, xviii Icc slnuggish nssonecv greswths inspose-s sendinec re-s traint. This article examines the evidence to determine whether money demand behavior over the last two years has been erratic enough tojusti& the observed volatility in money growth,
MONEY GROWTH AND THE DEMAND

FOR MONEY
Chart 1 provides evidence on short-mn (quarterly) money growth volatility. The chart plots, for each quarter since 11/1962, quarterly money growth (at an annual rate) less the average of money growth over the prior 12 quarters. Thus, for example, the -2.0 percent reading for 111/1962 shows that money grew 2 percentage points less in that quarter than its average growth rate in the previous three years.
The volatility shown in this chart has two different dimensions. One dimension is simply the magnitude ofthe deviation from trend. For example, in the third quarter of 1980, money grew at a rate 8 percentage points above trend, the largest positive deviation in the last 20 years. In the second quarter of 1980, money grew at a rate over 10 percentage points below trend, the largest negative deviation in the last 20 years. Thus, according to such a measure, money growth has been quite volatile over the last two years.
The second dimension is the frequency with which deviations of money growth relative to trend change signs. The chart shows that money growth relative to trend frequently has changed sign from positive to negative, and vice versa, over the last two years. This fluctuation stands in sharp contrast to the historical norm whereby money growth usually is above or below trend for several quarters in a row. Thus, the increased frequency ofchange ofquarterly money growth relative to trend also supports the view that money growth over the last two years has been volatile. For example, if the quantity of money that people hold remains unchanged while the average price of goods and services fall, a given stock of money will have greater value; thatis, it will pennit the purchase ofmore goods and services. Thus, the economically meaningful measure is the money stock relative to the average price of goods and services. 4
Analysts commonly hypothesize that real money balances move opposite to a change in market interest rates and in tandem with a change in real income. Achange in market interest rates negatively affects the demand for real balances, because it represents the opportunity cost ofholding money. If market interest rates rise, individuals forgo more interest income by holding money and thus are expected to desire less money balances. As real income rises, however, individuals will want larger real money balances to purchase more goods and services. Thus, a change in real income is expected to have a similar effect on desired real money balances. -1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197$ 1979 1980 1981 1982 .414 1 141•p14e(14/ iini pirical 4.V 1 Øfl4lf~i~tI•ittf~i.t1(l .LP~ju iz.trcn lo empirically investigate the demand for nioney, the relationship between real money balances (M/ P)ãnd current interest rates (it), real income (yr), and lagged real balances (M/P) 11
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, is estimated using multiple regression analysis. The equation to be estimated is typically written as:
(1) fM/P) 1
The coefficients fifl. fly. $~and~show how desired real money balances respond to changes in the respective independent variables. The residual, El, is assumed to be a random ranuble that fluctuates about zero. Itrepresents the unexplained variation of actual real money balances from that predicted by the combination of the estimated regression coefficients and the values of the independent variables.
Last periods real balances are usuall included in empirical estunations of nmnev demand to capture an assumed adjustment process. Because of relevant transaction costs of adjusting real mone balances, it is usually presumed that actual balances only slowly adjust to desired levels. The lagged value of real balinices is included to capture such an adjustment process. By including lagged real money hahuices in the equation, we are assuming actual real balances only partially adjust to current changes in interest rates or real income.
A common procedure used in evaluating the behavior of money demand is to consider how well When the deviations are consistently one-sided, Isowever, one can e'oncl tide that a ''shift'' in the behavioral relationship has occurred (i.e., one of the coefficients, [lii, /3k, /32 or /33, has changed). Chart 2, however, shows no evidence of consistent one-sided errors. Thus, thc're is little evidence front these s insulations to indicate a ''shift'' in the behavioral re I at i misIn!).
Moreover, recognize that if policvmakers incorrectly equate prediction errors with shifts in money demand, then they will view any observed behayior in real money balances as correct. Thus, in either the ease of rapid or slow money growth, no corrective action would be called for. however, if these disturbances are not true shifts in money demand, polievmakers will actually allow money gro\vtls to fluctuate more tlsan necessary'.
Nloney,'' this Rerictc (junt'/ July 1980), pp. 13-23, where it is argo t'd ti at static forecast t'rnors pa ni de a lit'tte r fti, n idat ii at frot ii svlsi c'ls to j ridge sit ills in the (It-ittand for mull t'y 5 T Is is is tn ic rega dltess isf tht' size' tA tise emo r, ht'cao Se titt' rt' is al witvsa posit i Sr prohahi lit>-of d raw in g ho in tist' t'x I a' lilt' tails tsf a normal prohabi] it> distribution, an empirical relationship such as equatiois 1 sinitilates or predicts actual real money balances beyond the estimation period.~Chart 2 plots the level ol'real money balances simulated with equation 1 and the actual real money balances for the out-of-sample mterval 1/198()_1/1982.6 Table 1 If tIns shift were pc'rmamtemtt, as this argument ii iggests, the predictiomm error should remain negatn-c for all quartd'rs after 11/1980. Chart 2 slton's, however, tltat the equation does izo t c-ohs i stcntlv overpredict real balamices after 11/1980. Actual real halamtces in 111/1980, instead. were slightly higher thamt the relationship wouitl suggest. Ru rtlser, real balamtces werde slightly higher, nit ax-erage, tltlm the equation implies for the full Ill/I 980-1/1982 period. -f lists, one cannot empirically si ipport the argument that a persistemmt, sizable diownslnft iii money dccmnanch was prc-ecipi tatedl by rd'cord in td'rest rates in 11/1980.
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The secottd arguntent in support of' a money diemamsd dowmmsls i 11 in 11/1980 comttemids that tlte insptis itiomm of credit control iii NI arch 1980 was rcspotisible fbr a decrease in dlesired meal halamtces. Such itt argumc'mst ccsntrachicts ecotstmnc theory, hosvever. With credi it cdimmtrols explicitly Iitniti a g the extetts ion of batik credit, in dividual.s amid bus imiess 32 firitis \v ouldh des ire lam'ger muonev balamtces for anticipated transactions or precatmtionary' pumrposes . 'Ihtus, theory' sumggests amt increase imi mone demamid chumring this period, not a dhecrc-ase Thus, both auxil iarv argumtmen ts in favor of a behavioral shift iii money deniamtd in 11/1980 lack re itlier logical foundation or supportive emmmpirical evidence. Moreover, if there \vas a heh avioral shift itt atone>-dlemand, the excess supply' (sumpply exceeding demand) of mnonev nntst have lieen offset by an increase in densand elsewhere. In other worc!s, if economnic partieipaitts actuallv wanted less m none>-bal an c'es, the> must has-c desired more of' somuetlnmtg else imi exchammge. There is little evidence, however. of immcreased dent and fur labor, goods auth servic't-es , or finamicial assets in the ed:onomnv.
Ftmrtlter, the generally dccl imung i mitere-st rates Pt thi is period do mmot miecessaril suggc'st a beh as-iorah diowmislnft ut money deniammd as many insist. Dcdining interest rates did) suggest an excess supply of credit, whiich can conic about either because of' an incre-'ase in credit supply or a clecrc'ase in crc'clit deniandi. Only an increase in tIme supply of credit (as imtdli\'idtials become more wi I hug to gis'e sip mtioney today in exchange for a promitise of' mtionev iii time fmitu re) won Id be consistent witlt the muotion of a dow-mmshift imi momiev dlemtiatid in 11/1980, simice there is no es-idcttce of an incrdeased dlemnaitdl elsewhere which ss'ould be required tts offset the decreased demand fUr hot/i credlit andf mone>-. Yet, thereappears little evidence ofan increased 1 supply ofcredht i a tIns period. Chart 3 shows tIm at the total funds raisech by nonfittancial sectors clet'Iined mnarkedlv ut 11/1980 . Tliuis, tIn' fnhl in rates iii the sec'omt~iqmmarter of 1980 is bc'tter explainedl hr n'c-akening credlit demmtands associatedl xvi tim the recess iomt, rather tItan the imicreasedi supply of credht. 
